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In general, the consumer must depend on others to provide their software solutions.
However, this outsourcing of software development has caused it to become more and
more abstract as to where the software is actually being developed and by whom, and it
poses a potentially large security problem for the consumer as it opens up the possibility for
rogue functionality to be injected into an application without the consumer’s knowledge
or consent. This begs the question of ‘How do we know that the software we use can
be trusted?’ or ‘How can we have assurance that the software we use is doing only the
tasks that we ask it to do?’ Traditional methods for thwarting such activities, such as
virus detection engines, are far too antiquated for today’s adversary. More sophisticated
research needs to be conducted in this area to combat these more technically advanced
enemies.
To combat the ever increasing problem of rogue applications, this dissertation has
successfully applied and extended the information retrieval techniques of n-gram analysis
and document similarity and the data mining techniques of dimensionality reduction and
attribute extraction. This combination of techniques has generated a more effective Trojan
horse, rogue application detection capability tool suite that can detect not only standalone
rogue applications but also those that are embedded within other applications. This re-
search provides several major contributions to the field including a unique combination
of techniques that have provided a new tool for the administrator’s multi-pronged defense
to combat the infestation of rogue applications. Another contribution involves a unique
method of slicing the potential rogue applications that has proven to provide a more robust
rogue application classifier. Through experimental research this effort has shown that a
viable and worthy rogue application detection tool suite can be developed. Experimental
results have shown that in some cases as much as a 28% increase in overall accuracy can
be achieved when comparing the accepted feature selection practice of mutual information
with the feature extraction method presented in this effort called randomized projection.
Key words: rogue application detection, information retrieval, data mining, n-gram analy-
sis, clustering, dimensionality reduction, randomized projection
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In general, a consumer, whether corporate or private, must depend on some other
entity to deliver their software needs. This software can come from several different
sources ranging from software development firms to downloading freeware from the In-
ternet. These software needs include, but are not limited to, the operating system, virus
detection engines, firewall systems, or the latest database software to hold consumer mu-
sic files. Even specialized applications for corporate business needs are often purchased
rather than developed “in-house.” The outsourcing of application development coupled
with the globalization of the software development market means that where software
is being developed and by whom is becoming more and more abstract. This scenario
presents a large security problem for the consumer in that the developers of these com-
puting applications may not have the same philosophies or views as the users of these
applications. An example scenario might be as follows: a virus detection developer pro-
vides a consumer with a detection engine that is programmed to ignore certain viruses and
labels the machine as “clean” or free of viruses. Another example could involve a fire-
wall software developer manipulating the consumer’s firewall application to report to an
outside entity information regarding network traffic data that passes through the firewall,
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without the consumer’s knowledge or consent. This information could be as benign as the
website that the consumer is visiting all the way to actions such as what database queries
the users are making and their results. The latter example is known as an “information
leakage vulnerability attack.”
Information leakage can be defined as when “non-public” information is released
(or leaked) without the information owner’s knowledge or consent. This type of vulner-
ability can be introduced within an application at design time through malicious intent or
through poor programming practices. It can also be introduced by a rogue attacker after
deployment by being bundled with, or concealed within, a non-threatening application.
Symantec reported in their bi-annual threat report for the first half of 2005 that “six of the
top ten spyware (information leakage) programs were delivered to their victim by being
bundled with some other program.” [65]
I label these vulnerabilities, whether with or without malicious intent, as rogue
functionalities and the executables that contain rogue functionality as rogue applications.
Whether the applications have malicious intent or not, rogue applications are “defined to
be programs that perform a malicious function, such as compromising a system’s security,
damaging a system or obtaining sensitive information without the owner’s informed con-
sent.” [2,59] The concept of rogue applications that have rogue functionalities is not a new
idea. The first accounts of the existence of rogue applications can be dated back to 1949
when John von Neumann postulated that a computer program could replicate itself. [71]
However, the problem of accurately and effectively detecting and eradicating these rogue
applications is still a difficult research problem.
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1.1 Motivation
Traditionally, rogue applications are categorized into the following three groups
based primarily on their delivery mechanisms: viruses, worms and Trojan horses. A virus
cannot propagate throughout the network to reach its victims on its own; some action
is required by the user to activate the virus, for example execution of an application on
the target system. On the other hand a worm is self-contained and can transport itself
over the network to its victims usually through some known vulnerability in the victim’s
computer that has yet to be dealt with through updating or patching. Lastly, a Trojan
horse takes on the appearance of a benign application but underneath actually performs
some rogue functionality, for example information leakage. [44] Although they arrive at
the final destination in different manners, all three variations exist to do harm to a user’s
computer or disrupt the user’s activities.
To combat these attacks on a system, industry as well as the home consumer has
turned to anti-virus software which contain virus detection engines. “A large percentage
of the security software industry is built on the practice of looking for the digital patterns
(signatures) that identify known threats.” [51] According to the 2007 Computer Secu-
rity Institute (CSI) Computer Crime and Security Survey, anti-virus software, which is a
signature based solution, accounted for 54.3 percent of the total budget for industry soft-
ware security in 2005. [51] Though very good at what they do, virus detection engines
rely on a database of signatures to detect known rogue applications. These signatures
are “case-specific features extracted from viruses in order to detect those same instances
in the future” [26] and must be updated each time a new and previously unknown rogue
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application surfaces. The signatures attempt to capture the syntactic characteristics and
therefore are vulnerable to obfuscation techniques. [48] The creation of these signatures
is a manual and time consuming activity. Each potential rogue application must be first
gathered, which is difficult in and of itself, then analyzed and dissected to determine if
it in fact has a malicious intent. If a malicious intent is found, the analyst must find an
identifying signature that can be used by the detection engine for detecting it in the wild.
These solutions are far too antiquated for today’s adversary. According to CSI “criminals
have pushed the state of [rogue software] to a point where signature detection is less and
less effective.” [51] It also has to be noted that adversaries have access to all of the modern
anti-virus tools and can easily modify their rogue application to overt detection.
Signature based systems inherently limit the detection of new and previously un-
known types of rogue attacks. To make this method more difficult, rogue application
writers are getting much better at disguising or obfuscating their applications. Obfusca-
tion is the act of hiding the meaning of something from view. In the case of application
code, obfuscation is done to prevent reverse engineering of the application. Obfuscation
is such a powerful technique that Christodorescu noted in his comparison of three popular
commercial virus detection engines that they “could be subverted by very simple obfusca-
tion transformations.” [15] With the introduction of rogue application writing kits freely
available on the Internet anyone can download these and become a rogue application writer
instantly. This easy access exponentially increases the amount of rogue applications that
are in the wild for signature writers to analyze. To try to combat this limitation, some of
the more modern anti-virus software systems employ heuristics based detection. Heuris-
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tic detection tries to identify a rogue application by partially running the beginning of the
application. If no rogue functionality has been detected during the partial run, control of
the application is turned over to the system. Even though these systems claim they can
detect new and previously unknown attacks, these methods still have their limitations. For
example, “both Network Associates’ McAfee VirusScan and Symantec’s Norton Antivirus
missed the Melissa virus completely with their heuristics scanners.” [62]
The purpose of this research was to help answer the important software assurance
question of ‘How do we know that the software we are using is doing what we asked it
to do and more importantly nothing more?’ The main focus of this research effort has
been to design and develop a process that aids in the detection of rogue applications by
combining techniques from the information retrieval and data mining fields. Particular
concentration has been given to Trojan horses as described above.
Previous attempts [26, 36, 37, 50] to use methodologies and techniques from in-
formation retrieval and data mining have had some success but all have come against the
‘curse of dimensionality.’ The ‘curse of dimensionality,’ first referred to by Bellman [10],
generally describes the computational issues related to performing mathematical opera-
tions within an extremely high dimensional space. These dimensions can number in the
108 and higher range. Therefore, a capability to reduce the number of features to a more
manageable number is very useful in countering this problem. Making any decisions
based on this high-dimensional data will require the construction of a low-dimensional
embedding that preserves the underlying “structure” hidden in the data. For this research
I used a technique called randomized projection [40, 42] to create the low-dimensional
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embeddings. This work has shown that these randomized projection algorithms can guar-
antee that the distances between points in the original data set remain almost invariant in
the projected data set, which usually has a dramatic reduction in the number of dimensions.
It is my belief that a multi-pronged defense approach where there are several
weapons in the administrator’s toolbox is needed to attack this problem. Developing a
more effective rogue application detection tool through the use of information retrieval and
data mining methodologies, as well as dimensionality reduction through randomized pro-
jections will provide one more weapon in the consumer’s toolbox to attack this problem.
No one is immune from these malicious attacks; from the corporation to the unsuspecting
home user, everyone is at risk. Therefore, an entire range of consumers can benefit from
this research effort.
1.2 Statement of Hypothesis
In this dissertation research I have applied and extended the information retrieval
techniques of n-gram analysis and document similarity and the data mining techniques of
dimensionality reduction and attribute selection. The overall hypothesis of this research
was that rogue application detection could be accomplished by cleverly combining infor-
mation retrieval and data mining techniques. The specific components of this hypothesis
that I have tested are:
1. By applying and extending the information retrieval technique of n-gram analysis
and the data mining technique of attribute extraction, a Trojan horse, rogue appli-
cation detection capability tool can be developed that will provide a true positive
rate above 98% and false positive rate below 3%.
2. By combining information retrieval and data mining techniques in concert with
the dimensionality reduction technique of randomized projection, a more accurate
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solution in detecting rogue attacks can be developed when compared to seminal
efforts currently used in research today. A more accurate solution is defined in
terms of a 3% increase in overall accuracy when comparing this method to that of
the mutual information dimensionality reduction method.
In summary, this research has focused on obtaining predictive features from ap-
plications using n-grams, performing feature extraction using the technique of random-
ized projection and creating a prediction capability using cosine similarity techniques and
methodologies. This research has shown that by using the power of randomized projec-
tions to create an accurate low-dimensional embedding of the original data, an ability to
better use the power of the prediction algorithms will be gained. With the results of this
research effort, which I will present below, I claim that this technique provides a rogue ap-
plication detection capability that is “better” than the current popular mutual information
technique by comparing my results to those of Kolter’s. For this research “better” has
been defined in terms of performance, measured using standard validation performance
factors.
1.3 Contributions
With the successful completion of this research I have produced a unique detection
capability that has positively augmented the current capabilities to provide for greater cov-
erage in the fight against rogue applications. Specifically the main practical contributions
of this research are:
• Extension of rogue application detection capabilities that enable greater protection
of consumer systems
• Development of a rogue detection capability that successfully uses aspects of in-
formation retrieval and data mining
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• Successful validation of the usefulness of the combination of data mining and in-
formation retrieval techniques as applied to the rogue application detection prob-
lem
• New to rogue application detection literature, an approach that extracts the code
and data sections from an application and thereby produces a higher accuracy de-
tection tool
• Most importantly, the development of a unique method for selecting attribute sets
using the dimensionality reduction technique of randomized projection from target
data for greater success rate in detecting rogue applications
1.4 Organization
The remainder of this proposal is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an
overview of the current literature on this research topic. Chapter 3 provides the experi-
mental plan that was conducted for this research, including short descriptions of the re-
search components for the rogue application detection capability. Chapter 4 provides the
experimental results and analysis of both the preliminary proof of concept and the full
experiment using a large data set. Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation with future work
and both completed and expected publications.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
It has been proven that distinguishing between an application that has rogue code
embedded in it and an application that does not is intractable in the general case. [5] See
Appendix A for the formal proof provided by Adleman. Adleman’s proof shows that to
detect all possible viruses in a given application reduces to the halting problem. However,
this does not discount the idea that generic decisions for detecting broad classes of rogue
functionality can be made.
This research used the generic decision basis to explore and evaluate the effective-
ness of using a combination of information retrieval and data mining techniques, with the
concentration on dimensionality reduction, as a solution to part of the rogue application
detection problem. As described in the motivation section of the introduction, the iden-
tification and detection of rogue applications was the tract of this research effort. There
are two high-level major pathways of exploratory research into solving the rogue appli-
cation detection problem. These are static analysis and dynamic analysis. I delineate
these two methods in the following manner. A dynamic analysis technique involves the
actual execution of the potential rogue application to detect if in fact rogue functionality is
taking place within the executable. On the other hand I define static analysis techniques
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as making the rogue functionality determination without having to execute the application.
These two camps can not solve this problem alone but only in concert can the total solution
be derived.
This research effort was not the first to try to solve the important topic of detecting
and classifying new or previously unknown rogue applications. Presented in the remain-
der of this chapter is a survey of the most significant research that is related to the efforts
discussed in this paper.
2.1 Static Analysis
The advantage of static analysis in the detection of rogue software applications is
that detection is made without having to execute the application and risk harm or contam-
ination to the network from any potential rogue functionality embedded within it. Below
are descriptions of the major research efforts that have used various methods of static
analysis to solve this detection problem.
2.1.1 General
In an early work Lo et al. [41] described their tool known as the Malicious Code
Filter (MCF). They developed a “novel approach to distinguish malicious code from be-
nign programs” using what they identify as “tell-tale signs.” According to Lo, “a tell-tale
sign is a program property that allows us to determine whether or not a program is ma-
licious without requiring a programmer to provide a formal specification.” [41] Some of
these “tell-tale” signs that their filter looks for include: file reading and writing, program
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execution, anomalous data flow and authentication. [41] In identifying a Trojan login ap-
plication they stated that it was “detectable with the ‘Authentication’ tell-tale sign.” [41]
It has to be noted that Lo et al. does not identify which Trojan horse application their
tool was able to detect or provide any experimental results to validate their claims. They
simply state that their tool is successful on the small data set that they were using.
Though not claiming to use information retrieval methodologies, Christodorescu et
al. [16] do similar work using ‘templates’ which contain ‘instruction sequences’ of rogue
functionalities. Their work, then, is to analyze a target application and determine the simi-
larity of segments of the target application to their templates. The similarity is determined
“if there exists an assignment to variables from the template node expression that unifies
it with the program node expression.” [16]
2.1.2 Information Retrieval Related
Information retrieval, traditionally, is the “part of computer science which studies
the retrieval of information (not data) from a collection of written documents.” [8] These
retrieved documents’ aim is to “satisfy a user’s information need.” [8] One of the more
notable uses of information retrieval has been in the field of document authorship. Here
the “information need” is to determine whether or not a particular person(s) authored a par-
ticular document or collection of documents. There are several popular examples in this
area including determining if William Shakespeare actually authored the works attributed
to him [27], did Hamilton or Madison write the 12 disputed Federalist papers [13, 24] or
did Paul write all the books of the Christian New Testament Bible attributed to him [53].
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These techniques have been used more recently in the area of software forensics to deter-
mine application authorship [21, 25, 54, 64] as well as determining programming plagia-
rism [14, 70]. The idea of using clues from one item to make a determination on another
or fulfill an “information need” is not a foreign concept. Therefore making the leap of
using this methodology to determine whether or not a particular application has rogue
functionality is not foreign.
As with any of the techniques in either information retrieval or data mining below,
feature selection is pivotal to the detection/prediction success of the method. There have
been several efforts [3, 4, 32, 36, 37, 43, 50, 74] that look at using the information retrieval
concept of n-grams as a potential technique for feature selection. An n-gram is “any
substring of length n.” [8] In most of these efforts the gram (which will be the composite
of the substring) is a byte in hexadecimal form.
Abou-Assaleh et al. used the Common N-Gram (CNG) analysis method [33]
which has been used in authorship attribution and text clustering to detect rogue appli-
cations. [3, 4] “The CNG classification method relies on profiles for class representa-
tion.” [3, 4] The most frequent n-grams represent a class profile with a parameterized
length. [3, 4] To overcome the computational complexity that goes with the large num-
ber of n-grams produced from a data set, Abou-Assaleh et al. “limited” the number of
n-grams to those that had the highest frequencies. [3] Once they had their feature vectors,
they used the traditional information retrieval method k-nearest neighbors, with k = 1, for
their classification. Although the authors never mention the size of their data set in terms
of number of executables, they do note that it consists of Windows binary executables
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that contain worms and viruses. They experimented with several variables including the
length of the n-grams, the maximum number of n-grams to consider as well as the size of
the CNG profiles with a reported highest detection rate of 94%. [3] Although this sounds
like a good number, there are other factors that need to be considered. One of these factors
that the authors do not mention is the false positive rates for the experiments. This is very
important because if their false positive rate was 50%, meaning that their solution identi-
fied 1 out of 2 applications as rogue, then a 94% detection rate is meaningless. Another
factor to consider is that the authors state that the 94% detection rate experiment had some
of the training data mixed in with the testing data. [3] Unfortunately, this biasing of the
testing data cast some doubt on these results. Though issues exist with their experimental
results the methodology is sound and can be built upon.
Marceau [43] puts an interesting twist on the problem of using n-grams as features
by having “multiple-length” grams instead of the traditional single n-length gram. To
accomplish this he first creates a suffix tree of the n-grams where n is ‘large enough’ and
then “compacts the suffix tree to a directed acyclic graph (DAG) by merging ‘equivalent’
subtrees.” [43] By doing this Marceau has a set of grams with varying lengths that is
“equivalent to the original set of n-grams.” [43] From this suffix tree the authors create
a Finite State Machine (FSM) for their “two-finger algorithm” which is their classifier.
This algorithm is very similar to a sliding window algorithm. Here each “move of a
finger” will correspond to a branch in the suffix tree or a state on the FSM. The authors
presented results of their algorithm on three different data sets (the lpr and inetd data from
the University of New Mexico and data from the CORBA Immune System) as compared
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to the sliding window work of Forrest. [23] The results of the comparison were very
similar but the advantage went to the “two-finger algorithm” because of the far less space
needed to store the feature sets. Although these results are promising, the authors note
that they are preliminary. [43] Additional work needs to be done to see if the additional
computational complexity trade-off for computing the suffix tree and corresponding FSM
is worth the gains in space reduction.
Zhang et al. [74] propose a new method of reducing the feature set dimension by
using rough set theory. They narrow their work by focusing exclusively on n-grams of
size 2 bytes. Once the 2-byte grams have been extracted the authors select their features
based on mutual information. This is the same method that Kolter [36, 37] (see Section
2.1.4) uses. However, Zhang et al. further reduce the feature set dimension by using
Rough Set Theory. [74] They look at the fundamental concepts of “reducts and cores.”
Because of the computation overhead associated with calculating the relative core, the
authors developed “an efficient implementation based on positive region definition.” [74]
This allows them to quickly reduce redundant attributes. Though the authors present some
preliminary results on a small Windows PE data set using a clustering algorithm, the main
focus of their research was to present a novel feature reduction methodology using Rough
Set Theory.
2.1.3 Data Mining Related
Along the same timeframe as Lo’s et al. work described above there was an effort
ongoing at IBM’s T. J. Watson Research Center by Kephart et al. [32] to use “biologically
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inspired anti-virus algorithm” methods to detect and defend against rogue applications.
This work concentrated on boot sector viruses using both single-layer and “hand-crafted”
multi-layer neural networks. The key element in this work, as with any of these ap-
proaches, is the feature selection. Kephart et al. “extracted a set of 3-byte strings or
‘trigrams’ that appeared frequently in boot sectors of viruses but infrequently in legiti-
mate ones.” [32] These ‘trigrams’ were all hand created after human examination of boot
sectors in their data set, which was about 150 boot sectors. Their work resulted in a
neural network that had a detection rate of approximately 85% on their test data set. [32]
The result is good and not surprising considering the amount of pairing of features to fit
within the parameters of their neural network. This pairing was done purely by popula-
tion density of the particular ‘trigram’ with respect to the infected and benign test sets. An
improvement on this technique was made by Tesauro et al. and incorporated into IBM’s
Anti-Virus software. [66] This work was able to improve the previous effort [32] and gain
100% accuracy rate of the benign boot sectors but still in the neighborhood of 80% to
85% on the target rogue boot sectors. [66] One of the possible shortcomings with this ap-
proach is the resource requirements, which the authors state are “considerable obstacles”
in deployment in large commercial efforts. [66]
In one of the first ‘major’ efforts to use data mining techniques to detect and iden-
tify rogue applications, Schultz et al. moved away from boot sector viruses and used Naı̈ve
Bayes learners for detection. [59] For this effort Schultz and his group gathered approxi-
mately 4500 applications from various FTP sites and used McAfee’s virus scanner to label
them as benign or rogue. [59] This produced a data set of approximately 3400 rogue ap-
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plications and 1100 benign applications. Around 5% of their data were Trojan horses and
the remaining 95% were viruses. [59] A subset of these applications was in the Windows
Portable Executable (PE) format.
Schultz used a combination of three different feature extraction techniques: binary
behavior profiling, string sequences and a binary transformation program hexdump, and
three different learning algorithms: an inductive rule-based learner, a probabilistic method
and a multiple classifier combiner system. [59]
For the first feature extraction technique they only used the subset of data that
contained the Windows PE formatted binary files. They extracted three types of features
using GNU’s Bin-Utils tool suite. These were a list of Dynamic Linked Libraries (DLL’s)
used by the binary, a list of DLL function calls made by the binary and the number of dif-
ferent function calls made within each DLL. [59] Each one of these methods is composed
of features that are combined into feature vectors of various lengths. The first method
contained about 30 binary features, where the value of the feature was a 1 if present and
a 0 if not present, and the second method contained approximately 2200 binary features,
defined the same way as the first. The third method produced about 30 integer values
that corresponded to the count of the number of times a particular function call was made
within the application. [59]
The second and third feature extraction techniques looked at the entire data set. In
the second feature extraction technique Schultz used the GNU Strings program to extract
all sequences that contain printable characters from any location in the target applica-
tions. [59] Though these strings can be changed easily, they created binary feature vectors
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that identified whether a particular string was present in the application or not. In the third
and probably most robust feature extraction method the authors use, they create features
of two-byte byte-sequences that were extracted from the applications using the hexdump
tool. The thought process of using these techniques is that there will be similar sequences
in rogue applications that are different than the similar sequences in the benign applica-
tions.
For their first feature set, Schultz et al. used an inductive rule learner called RIP-
PER [17, 18]. RIPPER “builds a set of rules that identify the classes while minimizing
the amount of error.” [59] Their rule set consisted of four rules for defining a rogue bi-
nary and “if it is inconsistent with all of the rogue binary hypotheses” [59] it is labeled
benign. For the remaining two feature sets they used Naı̈ve Bayes (used with the string
features) and Multi-Naı̈ve Bayes (used with the hexdump features) algorithms. They state
that the Naı̈ve Bayes rules were more complicated than the RIPPER rules which were
just a “collection of the rules generated by each of the component Naı̈ve Bayes classi-
fiers.” [59] Therefore the “prediction of the Multi-Naı̈ve Bayes algorithm was the product
of the predictions of the underlying Naı̈ve Bayes classifiers.” [59] Through their experi-
ments Schultz concluded that the Multi-Naı̈ve Bayes had the best detection rate but that
for overall accuracy (factoring in false positive rate) that Naı̈ve Bayes was best. Table 2.1
presents the cumulative results of their experiments.
Although these experiments show positive results, even the authors admit that they
are far from perfect. One of the deficiencies is that the RIPPER algorithm was trained
on a far smaller data set that the other algorithms. Therefore a true comparison between
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the algorithms can not be made. Also, Schultz did not present an experimental result that
combined the features from the three feature vector sets together into another feature set.
Another potential shortcoming with these feature sets is their dependence on the strings,
function names and DLL names extracted staying consistent over time. [59]
Table 2.1
Cumulative Results from Schultz [59]
Detection False Positive Overall
Profile Type Rate (%) Rate (%) Accuracy (%)
Signature Method - Bytes (hexdump) 33.75 0 49.28
RIPPER - DLLs used 57.89 9.22 83.62
RIPPER - DLL function calls 71.05 7.77 89.36
RIPPER - DLL counted function calls 52.63 5.34 89.07
Naı̈ve Bayes - strings 97.43 3.80 97.11
Naı̈ve Bayes - Bytes (hexdump) 97.76 6.01 96.88
2.1.4 Combination of Information Retrieval and Data Mining
One of the first and few works to combine the methodologies and techniques
of information retrieval and data mining was by Kolter et al. [36, 37]. They extracted n-
grams from their target dataset to create feature vectors for various data mining algorithms.
Their data set had approximately 3800 applications gathered from various locations in-
cluding applications from folders on Windows XP and 2000 operating systems, as well
as downloaded from various websites such as download.com (www.download.com) and
SourceForge (sourceforge.net). [36,37] About 2000 of these applications were benign and
the remaining applications, gathered from VX Heavens (vx.netlux.org) contained various
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viruses, worms and Trojan horses. [36,37] Unlike Schultz’s work, all of these applications
were in the Window’s PE format.
Although the authors mention several methods for feature types, they concentrate
on only n-grams, and more specifically n-grams that are four bytes in length. These
four-byte sequences were extracted from their applications after the hexdump conversion
tool had been applied converting each application into hexadecimal format. [36, 37] For
each n-gram extracted from all applications Kolter created a long feature vector containing
binary values of true if the particular n-gram was present in the application or false is it
was not. [36,37] To pair down the overwhelming number of features they had, the authors
“selected the most relevant attributes (i.e., n-grams) by computing the mutual information
(MI).” [36,37] They used the following modified formula from Yang et al. [73] for mutual
information:
MI(t) = ∑
v j∈{0,1}
∑
Ci
P(v j,Ci)log
P(v j,Ci)
P(v j)P(Ci)
(2.1)
Kolter defines each of the variables in their mutual information function as follows:
Ci is the ith class, v j is the value of the jth attribute, P(v j,Ci) is the proportion
that the jth attribute has the value v j in the class Ci, P(v j) is the proportion
that the jth n-gram takes the value v j in the training data, and P(Ci) is the
proportion of the training data belonging to the class Ci. [36, 37]
Kolter choose the top 500 n-grams produced by their mutual information algo-
rithm as the optimum size of the feature vector. Then they applied the following data
mining/machine learning algorithms: Instance-based learner, TFIDF (Term Frequency -
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Inverse Document Frequency), Naı̈ve Bayes, Support Vector Machines, Decision Trees
and a Classifier Combining Algorithm. [36, 37]
Instance-based learners predict by finding an “example in the collection most sim-
ilar to the unknown and return the example’s class label as its prediction for that un-
known.” [36, 37] Kolter used a variant of this method that returned the k most similar
making this algorithm just like k-nearest neighbor. [36, 37] The TFIDF is a traditional
information retrieval vector space weighting model. To classify an unknown example,
this weighting scheme, in conjunction with an information retrieval algorithm, computes
a similarity of the unknown feature vector with each feature vector in the data set. “The
method takes a weighted majority vote of the executable labels, and returns the class with
the least weight as the prediction.” [36] Naı̈ve Bayes is a probabilistic method and Sup-
port Vector Machines is a linear classifier. [36, 37] Decision trees are a classical data
mining technique where a tree is built by selecting attributes that produce the best splits in
the training data set with exterior nodes defined as a class. [36, 37] Classifier combining
is a majority vote of multiple decision trees that have been built with slightly different
parameters. [36, 37]
Table 2.2 presents their predicted (P) versus actual (A) detection rate results for
all the algorithms. The predicted rates are from tests performed on their entire data set,
meaning that they used the entire data set to create the predictors. The actual detection
rates are the results of applying these predictors to a smaller data set that has not been
touched throughout the process. This was called their “real-world” data set. Kolter stated
that even though the “Naı̈ve Bayes performed much better” the “boosted decision tree
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achieved the best overall performance in terms of best actual performance and matching
the predicted performance.” [37]
Table 2.2
Cumulative Results from Kolter [37]
Desired False Positive Rate (%)
Method 1 5 10
P (%) A (%) P (%) A (%) P (%) A (%)
Boosted Decision Tree 94 86 99 98 100 100
Support Vector Machine 82 41 98 90 99 93
Boosted SVM 86 56 98 89 99 92
Instance-based, k = 5 90 67 99 81 100 99
Boosted Naı̈ve Bayes 79 55 94 93 98 98
Decision Tree 20 34 97 94 98 95
Naı̈ve Bayes 48 28 57 72 81 83
Though some of the results are interesting, there is room for improvement. The
authors only look at n-grams for their feature set. They could have improved this work
by combining n-grams and other features which should produce more robust predictions.
Also, even the authors admit that their methods have “high computational overhead.” [37]
This is a detriment to any deployable solution but can be overcome with addition research
and experimentation.
A typical use of n-grams as features can be seen in [26] where Henchiri et al. scan
through every file for every n-gram, record their frequency and create a feature set. This
obviously would create a list of features that is far too long and would make the compu-
tational complexity too high for any viable solution. To overcome this Henchiri imposed
a “hierarchical feature selection process.” [26] In addition to feature selection, they have
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a feature elimination step in the hierarchy. In feature selection they specify an “intra-
family support threshold of features within each virus family.” [26] This “intra-family
support threshold” means that if a particular n-gram is above this pre-defined threshold,
the sequence is “retained as a candidate feature.” A second threshold is placed in the
feature elimination step. This threshold is for “inter-family support.” The authors state
that “this ensures that only those features that appear with a high enough inter-family sup-
port are retained.” [26] This step might pose a problem in that it would get rid of certain
features that are unique to a particular virus family. Results from using their feature ex-
traction method with several machine learning algorithms were positive as compared to
other more traditional methods. The authors admit the false positive rates are a little high
but still manageable.
Reddy et al. [50] develop their own unique n-gram feature selection measure called
‘class-wise document frequency.’ This ‘class-wise document frequency’ is a variant on
the traditional information retrieval concept of document frequency. Here the authors are
looking at the number of applications in a particular pre-defined class that contain a cer-
tain n-gram. [50] This provides for a further refinement as well as lowering the number
of features that exist for a particular class. Reddy also defines another concept called ‘rel-
evant n-grams.’ The ‘relevant n-grams’ for a particular class of applications is the top k
number of n-grams sorted on their frequency in the class. [50] Though they present a new
method of feature selection the novel idea here is the further dissection of document fre-
quency into a particular class frequency. To show that their feature selection method has
merit Reddy used multiple machine learning/data mining classifiers (SVM, decision tree
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and IBK) and combined them using the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence. Again the
novelty here is their method of combining the classifiers. The Dempster-Shafer Theory of
Evidence “is an alternative to traditional probabilistic theory for the mathematical repre-
sentation of uncertainty.” [50,60] It is a method for combining information from multiple
sources and dealing with discrepancies. [50] They compare their work with that of Kolter
and show slightly better results. The authors could improve this work by determining if
their methods can be extracted to other rogue application classes.
2.2 Dynamic Analysis
Traditionally dynamic analysis of rogue software applications is done by running
the potentially rogue application in a controlled/restricted environment, most times a vir-
tual environment. Willems et al. define two different approaches to dynamic analysis of
rogue applications:
• taking an image of the complete system state before rogue application execution
and comparing it to the complete system state after execution
• monitoring the rogue application’s actions during execution with the help of a
specialized tool, such as a debugger [72]
Here an analyst would manually step through the application using a debugger or actively
observe the results of the execution. As with static analysis above, this can be an ex-
tremely manual task and as noted there are far more rogue applications being created than
can be examined.
Most tools that are currently in use only look at one execution path [9, 68]. The
single execution path is the one that is executed in their virtual environment. Salois et
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al. [55] compared several single path Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) software tools,
including PC-cillin and eSafe Protect Desktop, for dynamically detecting rogue applica-
tions, in particular a time bomb. A time bomb is a rogue application “that is triggered in
a program when a specific logical condition relating to time is met.” [55]
Bayer et al. developed a tool called TTAnalyze that “dynamically analyzes the
behavior of Windows executables.” [9] Though the authors developed TTAnalyze on top
of a software emulator to reduce the footprint detectable by rogue applications it does not
completely remove it; therefore, rogue code can detect that they are not being executed
on the actual system. One way that Bayer admits this can happen is through “speed of
execution” differences between the real system and their emulated one. [9] Once a rogue
application can detect it is not being executed on a real system then potentially many of the
analysis results are void. The analysis process of TTAnalyze is similar to other dynamic
analysis techniques in that it executes the target application and collects all of the operating
system and function calls made by the target application. The interesting research result
is the authors accomplish this without ‘hooking’ the system or function calls. Instead they
use ‘page-directory base register’ which “contains the physical address of the base of the
page directory for the current process.” [9] Though there were potentially positive results
presented from TTAnalyze, it still is a single execution path tool and will potentially be
susceptible to detection by the target rogue application.
Another single execution path method is presented by Vasudevan et al. [68] named
Cobra. Cobra, which is actually a framework, is “facilitated by a technique that we call
stealth localized-executions.” [68] Basically, the authors state that the idea is to break
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down the target application into ‘blocks,’ insert some ‘invisible’ Cobra specific code con-
structs and then execute the blocks. [68] Although the authors claim these inserted in-
structions go un-noticed by the rogue application, they did not publish any experiments
that proved this is the case. The point of this effort was to show that the framework is
efficient at the task of dynamically analyzing rogue applications and not its comparative
performance to other potential solutions.
By only looking at a single execution path, a system does not take into account
the existence of rogue functionality that has ties to a particular event, for example a date
or a file condition. Moser et al. [46] proposes an effort to look at multiple execution
paths at the same time. This effort will have a higher expectancy of finding the rogue
functionality because the authors try to dissect all of the potential execution paths. To do
this their analysis technique is “driven by the input that the program processes.” [46] More
precisely they check for places in the target application where a condition, for example
branch, is determined based on some input and then take snapshots of the current state.
Moser lists the following as input prospects: “reading the current time from the operating
system, reading the content of a file or the result of a check for Internet connectivity.” [46]
If the target application performs one of these actions and then suddenly exits, the authors
can back up to the previous snapshot, provide the action, and allow the target application
to continue executing. [46] This seems to be a better method than just pursuing a single
path but there are still issues that must be solved, namely the overhead associated with
state saving and, as the author states, the problems created by ‘external effects’ such as
“sending data over the network.” [46] This work is still in its early stages and further
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investigation is needed, noted by the fact that in their test data set their analysis did not
follow multiple paths.
Moffie et al. [45] presented an effort that was geared directly toward detecting Tro-
jan Horses called the Harrier Application Security Monitor. Moffie’s approach attempts
to stop the rogue application after it is on the victim’s computer and started but before it
is executed. This is a different pathway than above because instead of a dedicated anal-
ysis system the Harrier Application Security Monitor works in concert with the existing
anti-virus software on the user’s computer.
Others have suggested a solution that involves having a formal program specifi-
cation for an application that spells out every intended behavior. [35] This in theory is a
good idea but in practice is probably unrealizable on a large scale. By requiring written
documentation that describes the behavior of an application the authors are introducing a
complex and difficult to get accurate process. For the most part these techniques are look-
ing at using system calls to detect the presence of rogue functionality when comparing the
system audit logs to the formal specifications.
Yet another method of dynamic analysis involves running the target application
and then analyzing the resulting audit logs for detection of rogue functionality. Rawat et
al. [49] and Florez-Larrahondo et al. [22] provide examples of this type of detection
method in their respective research efforts. Rawat applies a modified information re-
trieval method called a ‘binary weighted cosine metric’ as the similarity measurement for
a standard k-nearest neighbor classifier to make a determination of rogue functionality.
This ‘binary weighted cosine metric’ is an amalgam of the traditional cosine similarity
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measure and a binary similarity measure that produces a similarity measure between two
applications “using a metric that considers two factors; occurrence of system calls and the
frequency of all system calls in the processes.” [49] Though the results show promise,
improvement can be obtained by further investigation using a data set that more closely
matches current attack methodologies.
Florez-Larrahondo et al. looked at the problem of rogue application detection on
distributed high-performance systems. Their solution called for a system of ‘intelligent
anomaly detection agents’ to monitor both function and system call interfaces and feed
this information to a neural network and a discrete Hidden Markov Model. [22] What is
more interesting with this example versus Rawat is that the authors are using current data
over a real system instead of simulated data. The authors note “the system may suffer
from a large number of false positives because of difficulty collecting an adequate set of
samples to train the models.” [22] This is an issue with any potential solution in this realm
not just this solution. Those not withstanding, the results presented are positive and show
value in the research methodology.
2.3 Comparison of Static and Dynamic Methodologies
As can be seen, there have been several efforts using both static and dynamic
approaches to solve this important research problem. There are also advantages and
disadvantages to each method. When using a dynamic analysis methodology, whether
analyzing audit logs or system calls, you are actually executing the potentially rogue ap-
plication to make a prediction on intent. Because of the potential dangers involved, most
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researchers will execute these potentially rogue applications in virtual environments, such
as VMWare. However, many rogue application writers have designed in checks that can
detect whether or not the rogue application is being executed inside of a virtual environ-
ment. If one is detected, the rogue code will skip over the harmful parts of the appli-
cation, therefore, going unnoticed to the detection system. Also, recently Tom Liston
and Ed Skoudis of Intelguardians, at the request of the Department of Homeland Security,
have shown that a virtual environment can easily be circumvented and access to the host
machine gained. This negates any ‘security’ a researcher had by using the virtual environ-
ment for rogue detection. Even with the potential pitfalls, dynamic analysis does provide
real-time run-time analysis capabilities that static analysis can not provide.
Static analysis provides many advantages when attacking a problem as diverse and
difficult as rogue application detection. Since the potential rogue applications are not
executed there is no chance for accidental infestation as is the case with dynamic anal-
ysis. Though this is a positive, due to undecidability it is “impossible to certify stati-
cally that certain properties hold.” [11] That aside, static analysis of potential rogue ap-
plications can be accomplished without the run-time overhead associated with dynamic
analysis techniques. Using static analysis an analyst can discover all possible execution
paths. Because of the ability to analyze applications without the need to execute them,
this research has attacked the rogue application detection problem using static analysis
techniques. This was done with the understanding that the solutions created here were
only one piece of the larger solution that would include dynamic analysis.
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2.4 Dimensionality Reduction using Randomized Projection
As can be seen from several of the potential solutions presented above, rogue ap-
plication detection suffers from the problem that the data, once processed, is encoded in ex-
tremely high dimensions. This high-dimensional data, on the order of 108 or higher, limits
the kind and amount of analysis that can be performed. Traditionally, there have been two
categories of methods for dealing with the reduction of this type of high-dimensional data.
These are feature selection and feature extraction. Though both have the net effect of
reducing the dimensions of a given data set, I delineate these two methods in the following
manner. Feature selection is merely a selection of a subset of the original feature set to
produce the reduced dimension. Several examples of this type of dimensionality reduction
can be seen in [36,37,59,74]. The most notable example is Kolter’s [37] mutual informa-
tion. On the other hand feature extraction transforms, either linearly or non-linearly, the
original feature set into a reduced set that retains the most important predictive informa-
tion. Examples of this type include principle component analysis, latent semantic analysis
and randomized projection.
There have been some efforts [12, 42, 47] that look at using randomized projec-
tion techniques for dimensionality reduction. “Randomized projection refers to the tech-
nique of projecting a set of points from a high-dimensional space to a randomly chosen
low-dimensional subspace or embedding.” [69] Minnila et al. [42] are using random pro-
jection techniques to map sequences of events and find similarities between them. Their
specific application is in the telecommunication field looking at how to better handle net-
work alarms. Their goal is to “show the human analyst previous situations that resemble
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the current one” [42] so that a more informed decision about the current situation can be
made. Though their proposed solution is not perfect, it does show the promise of using
randomized projections in a similarity based application.
Arriaga et al. [6], in the field of concept learning, are using randomized projections
to learn concept classes while maintaining a desired level of robustness in their thresh-
olds. Their implementation is based on a neural network, which they call a neuronal,
that allows for the robustness parameter not to be known in advance. Hristescu et al. [28]
use the Smith-Waterman distance function in their randomized projection approach, called
SparseMap, to perform efficient similarity searches of protein databases. Cowen et al. [19]
are applying randomized projections in a pattern recognition problem where they are,
among other methods, clustering Positron Emission Tomography scan brain volumes. In-
dyk et al. [29] as well as Kleinberg [34] were both able to show positive results using
randomized projection in nearest neighbor searches.
Research that is more applicable to this dissertation work can be found in [12].
Bingham et al. apply randomized projections to an image and text retrieval problem. In
comparison to this research problem their dimensions are not as large, 2500 for images
and 5000 for text, but the results are still significant. The purpose of their work was to
show that, compared to other more traditional dimensionality reduction techniques, such
as principle component analysis or singular value decomposition, randomized projections
offered a greater detail of accuracy. The authors were also able to show that there was sig-
nificant computation saving by using randomized projections over other feature extraction
techniques, such as principle component analysis.
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In another text retrieval application, Kaski [31] successfully applied randomized
projections in his text retrieval application that used WEBSOM, a graphical self-organizing
map. Again Kaski turned to randomized projection as a method to overcome the compu-
tation expense that made other dimensionality reduction techniques infeasible when han-
dling high-dimensional data sets. After incorporating randomized projection into their
tool, the authors gained an additional 5% increase in classification and topic separation
than in previous methods used. [31]
The following efforts [38, 39, 47] use randomized projection in conjunction with
latent semantic indexing. Papadimitriou et al. [47] looking at another information retrieval
technique shows positive results in using randomized projections as a pre-processor to the
computationally expensive Latent Semantic Indexing. By simply applying randomized
projection to their data before computing the Latent Semantic Indexing, their asymptotic
running time for the overall system improved from O(mnc) to O(m(log2n+clogn)), where
m and n are the matrix size, c is the average number of terms per document. [47]
Kurimo [38] again showed the promise of using randomized projections as a pre-
processor to Latent Semantic Processing. By using the randomized projection techniques
the authors were able to “quickly generate approximately orthogonal vectors” [38] of their
features, in this case words. Because of the randomized projection method as their ap-
proximation, it allowed them to “feasibly use a very large vocabulary.” [38] Kurimo’s
results showed that using the randomized projection technique was “much faster and there
were much less complexity problems as the corpus increased.” [38]
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2.5 Summary
The currently published research efforts into detecting rogue applications have
promise. This promise comes in the form of providing higher detection rates than current
accepted commercial solutions but as with most any method there are shortcomings to
their effectiveness.
Current research into rogue application detection has involved using both static
and dynamic techniques. The major efforts using static techniques that also use method-
ologies from information retrieval and data mining attack the ‘curse of dimensionality’ by
use of feature selection techniques for dimensionality reduction. Though somewhat suc-
cessful, there is still room for improvement. Feature selection reduces the dimension of
the original data set by selecting a subset of the original features mostly based on mutual
information algorithms similar to that used by Kolter [37].
There have been no major published efforts that are looking at the concepts of fea-
ture extraction for dimensionality reduction when applying methodologies and techniques
from information retrieval and data mining. Feature extraction transforms, either linearly
or non-linearly, the original feature set into a reduced set that retains the most important
predictive information. Feature extraction takes into account predictive information from
all of the original features in the data set, not a subset of the features as feature selection
does.
The method that has been developed and is presented in this dissertation helps to
fill this gap by applying the methods and techniques of randomized projection as a feature
extraction technique to my data set. This extraction provides a reduced data set that allows
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my prediction algorithms to have more predictive power when compared to the data sets
produced by feature selection techniques of mutual information.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH EXPERIMENT PLAN AND APPROACH
In this dissertation, I have developed a research effort that applies and extends
the information retrieval techniques of n-gram analysis and document similarity and the
data mining techniques of dimensionality reduction and attribute extraction. This unique
combination of techniques, as shown through experimentation, generates a more effective
Trojan horse, rogue application detection capability tool suite, whether the application is
standalone or embedded within other applications. It will be shown in Chapter 4 that
this new tool suite is more effective than current feature selection methods. This suite
includes methods for feature/attribute extraction from target applications, sophisticated
feature set reduction from the data mining community, and classification capabilities using
document similarity from the information retrieval community. The remainder of this
chapter provides an introduction and overview of the techniques and methods that were
used in my research effort and a description of how the overall experimental plan for the
software suite was conducted.
3.1 Technique and Method Introduction
This research effort has developed a unique combination of techniques and meth-
ods that have not been presented in this manner before to attach the rogue application
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detection problem. Presented below are details regarding all aspect of the tool suite com-
ponents and functionality.
3.1.1 Feature Definition
In this portion of the research I have chosen a vector space model to represent
the data (applications). More specifically, the data is represented as a vector with each
dimension being defined as a feature which may or may not have a weight associated with
it. [57] Each of the features becomes “an independent dimension in a very high dimen-
sional space.” [61] To create these feature vectors, first a definition of what the features
contain is needed. For this research effort I used n-grams for the features. An n-gram is
“any substring of length n.” [8] Here the gram, which is the composite of the substring, is
a hexadecimal byte in the ASCII format. The n-grams were obtained by first converting
each target application in the data set into hexadecimal bytes and then concatenating each
set of n hexadecimal bytes. These sets of n hexadecimal bytes, or features, are defined by
a window of size n that slides across the converted target application.
3.1.2 Feature Weightings
I experimented with two different types of feature weighting models in this re-
search. First, I used one of the most common vector space weighting models called term-
frequency inverse-document-frequency (TFIDF). [63] The TFIDF vector space weighting
model “is composed of the product of a term frequency and the inverse document fre-
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quency for each term that appears in the document.” [58] The following are the formulas
for TFIDF.
t f id fi, j = t fi, j× id fi (3.1)
t fi, j =
ni, j
∑k nk, j
(3.2)
id fi = log
|D|
|{d j : ti ∈ d j}|
(3.3)
In the term frequency formula above (3.2), ni, j is the number of occurrences of the feature
in question in application d j and the denominator is the sum of the number of occurrences
of all terms in the application d j. In the inverse document frequency formula above (3.3),
the numerator is the total number of applications in the data set and the denominator is the
number of applications where a particular feature ti appears.
Term frequency, as the name suggests, is the number of times a particular term
appears in a document, or in this case, the number of times a particular n-gram appears in
an application. This can be noted as a measure of importance that the particular n-gram
has in the application. [58] The inverse document frequency is used to normalize the more
common terms. It is defined as the number of documents in which the term appears or
in this case the number of applications where the n-gram appears. [58] Therefore the
product of these two values will provide the “measure of the importance of the n-gram in
the application and the corpus as a whole.” [58] The second feature weighting model that
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I used in the research experimentation was a binary model where I assigned a 1 for each
n-gram feature that is in the application or a 0 for each feature that is not in the application.
This method provides the simplest of weighting methods but is surprisingly powerful.
3.1.3 Dimensionality Reduction
Clearly, using the total number of unique n-grams extracted from all of the applica-
tions in the data set to create the feature vectors will present a high-dimensional data prob-
lem. To combat this problem, the detection module concentrated on the feature extraction,
dimensionality reduction technique of randomized projection. In randomized projection,
“the original high-dimensional data is projected onto a lower-dimensional subspace using
a random matrix whose columns have unit lengths.” [12] This type of projection attempts
to retain the maximum amount of information embedded in the original feature set while
substantially reducing the number of features required. This feature reduction allows for
greater amounts of analysis to be performed. The core concept has been developed out of
the Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma [30] which states that any set of n points in a Euclidean
space can be mapped to Rt where t = O( logn
ε2
) with distortion ≤ 1 + ε in the distances.
Such a mapping may be found in random polynomial time. A proof of this lemma can
be found in [20]. As a comparison approach I used a feature selection method of mu-
tual information as described in Section 2.1.4. Note that this feature selection method for
dimensionality reduction is only defined using a binary feature weighting method.
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3.1.4 Prediction Methods
The last major step in this research process involves using the vectors that have
been created to produce a viable prediction model. For this research the prediction method
that I chose was cosine similarity which comes from the information retrieval community.
3.1.4.1 Cosine Similarity
To determine the relevance value between a particular document and a query,
measurements are taken of the similarity coefficient between the two vectors. For this
research the document was any vector that was in the data set and the query was a particular
vector of interest in the data set. This similarity coefficient measure “reflects the degree
of similarity in the corresponding terms and term weights” [57] and can be defined as
the angle between the two vectors or the dot product between the two vectors as well as
others. [61] For this research the cosine similarity function has been used.
Cosine similarity determines the similarity between two data vectors by measuring
the angular distance between them. “Cosine has the nice property that it is 1.0 for identical
vectors and 0.0 for orthogonal vectors.” [61] The following is the formula that was used
in this research for computing cosine similarity:
CosineSimilarity(Q,D) =
∑i wQ,iwD,i√
∑i w2Q,i
√
∑i w2D,i
(3.4)
This formula computes the similarity between a query Q and a document D. It does so by
summing all of the features of the two entities defined in the formula as w. Since I defined
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the features of this research to be n-grams, wQ,i is the weight of the ith n-gram in the query
and wD,i is the weight of the ith n-gram in the document.
By following a standard information retrieval methodology, applications, in ma-
chine readable format, are regarded as documents in the corpus. These “documents”
may or may not have a known rogue functionality. The query is an application, again
in machine readable format, which may or may not contain a certain type of rogue func-
tionality. This methodology provides an ability to search the corpus with a query and
retrieve/identify/predict potentially new rogue applications. This also provides an ability
to discover instances of other applications that contain the same type or family of intent,
for example one key-logging Trojan used to find another. Below is a small example of
how this detection will work.
Corpus
Document 1: 54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 61 20 74 65 73 74
Document 2: 54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 61 20 74 72 61 69 6E
Document 3: 54 68 61 74 20 69 73 20 61 20 67 72 65 61 74 20
69 64 65 61
Query
54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 6F 6E 6C 79 20 61 20 74 65 73 74
Using an n-gram size of 4 the similarity values between the query and the three documents
are 0.90, 0.58 and 0.08 respectively. For further detail, look at the similarity calculation
between the second document in the corpus and the query. Of the total number of n-grams
extracted, there were six that were in common between these two documents; 54687973,
68697320, 69732069, 73206973, 20697320 and 20612074. Since the numera-
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tor of the equation (3.4) looks at the common features between the two documents and the
population values of each of these are 1, the resulting numerator value is 6. The denom-
inator looks at all of the features of the two documents and in this case is equal to 10.38.
These values give the final similarity calculation of 6/10.38 = 0.58.
3.2 Experimental Plan
In this dissertation research I have applied and extended the information retrieval
techniques of n-gram analysis and document similarity and the data mining techniques of
dimensionality reduction and attribute extraction. The overall hypothesis of this research
was that rogue application detection can be accomplished by cleverly combining informa-
tion retrieval and data mining techniques. The following is the experimental plan that was
used for my rogue application detection tool suite. The experiments were divided based
on their applicability to my hypotheses defined in Section 1.2 above. The hypotheses are
restated here for convenience.
Hypothesis 1:
By applying and extending the information retrieval technique of n-gram
analysis and the data mining technique of attribute extraction, a Trojan horse,
rogue application detection capability tool can be developed that will provide
a true positive rate above 98% and false positive rate below 3%.
Hypothesis 1 Experimentation:
Feature Definition
Following the introduction above, Section 3.1.1, I used a vector space model and
represented the features as n-grams. To determine the most appropriate values of n I
performed the following experiments:
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1. n-grams size of 3
2. n-grams size of 4
3. n-grams size of 5
4. n-grams size of 6
5. n-grams size of 7
In each of the above experiments the input was the raw software applications that
were in the data set, converted to hexadecimal form. The results, or output, contained the
raw feature vectors that were then further processed by the tool suite.
For example, if my application contained the following sequence 43 57 FE DB
7A C3 and the n value was 4, then the ‘sliding window’ would produce the following
n-grams 4357FEDB, 57FEDB7A and FEDB7AC3.
Feature Weighting
For this portion of the research I performed experiments with the following differ-
ent feature weighting models:
1. Term-frequency inverse-document-frequency (TFIDF)
2. Binary weighting - 1 for each n-gram feature that was in the application or a 0 for
each feature that was not in the application
For the feature weighting aspect of these experiments the inputs consisted of the
feature vectors that were created in the feature definition portion of the experiment. The
results of this section further refined my data set providing for a more accurate rogue
application prediction.
Hypothesis 2:
By combining information retrieval and data mining techniques in concert
with the dimensionality reduction technique of randomized projection, a more
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accurate solution in detecting rogue attacks can be developed when com-
pared to seminal efforts currently used in research today. A more accurate
solution is defined in terms of a 3% increase in overall accuracy when com-
paring this method to that of the mutual information dimensionality reduction
method.
Hypothesis 2 Experimentation:
Dimensionality Reduction
To combat the high-dimensional data problem this research performed investiga-
tions using two different methods of randomized projection.
1. Creating a specially defined random matrix and projecting it upon the original
high-dimensional data set. This method involved the population of a random
matrix which was accomplished in the following two ways:
a. By selecting vectors that were normally distributed, random variables with a
mean of 0.0 and a standard deviation of 1.0.
b. By selecting the values of 0, +1 or -1 following a probability distribution of
2/3, 1/6 and 1/6 respectively [12].
2. Using a randomly selected number of feature sets and projecting them onto my
data set. This method involved experimenting with the following selection of
random sets:
a. Random set size selection of 500.
b. Random set size selection of 1000.
c. Random set size selection of 1500.
The inputs for this portion of experiments were the results of the feature definition
and feature weighting section. Those high-dimensional feature vectors were reduced to a
low-dimensional embedding by my randomized projection algorithms. The goal was to
test whether, for my particular data set type, the random matrix or the random set imple-
mentation provided a better solution for my rogue application detection capability. The
results of these low-dimensional embeddings were the input to my prediction algorithms
which determined if a particular application had rogue capability.
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3.2.1 Prediction Method
To determine the applicability and correctness of the two hypotheses of this disser-
tation, this research applied the information retrieval prediction methods of cosine similar-
ity to the low-dimensional embedded feature space. By applying this prediction method
consistently across all of the random projection methods introduced above as well as the
control method of mutual information, I was able to make a valid and accurate comparison
and show that the hypotheses were valid.
Cosine Similarity
I applied the cosine similarity equation (Eq. 3.4) to each query-document feature
vector pair in the data set. To determine the correctness I evaluated the results by setting
the prediction threshold to 21 separate values starting at 0.0 and continuing in increments
of 0.05 until a value of 1.0 was reached.
3.3 Validation
As with any new method, technique or technology that is introduced, a system for
determining its accuracy or validity must also be presented. Validation is a key compo-
nent to providing feasible confidence that any new method is effective at reaching a viable
solution, in this case a viable solution to the rogue application detection problem. Valida-
tion is not only comparing the results to what the expected result should be, but it is also
comparing the results of my techniques and methodologies to other published methods.
The first line of validation used with this research effort was to compare the re-
sults/predictions of the rogue applications analysis and detection software suite to the ex-
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pected results. The expected results in these experiments were known because the data
set was a labeled data set. The second line of validation was to compare these results
to those of other published research. To that end, several performance values were used
to measure and compare the performance of the experiments conducted in this research
effort to those of others published in the literature. These values include true positive
rate (TPR), false positive rate (FPR), accuracy and precision. TPR, also known as recall,
“is the proportion of relevant applications retrieved, measured by the ratio of the number
of relevant retrieved applications to the total number of relevant applications in the data
set.” [56] In other words TPR is the ratio of actual positive instances that were correctly
identified. FPR is the ratio of negative instances that were incorrectly identified. Accu-
racy is the ratio of the number of positive instances, either true positive or false positive,
that were correct. “Precision is the proportion of retrieved applications that are relevant,
measured by the ratio of the number of relevant retrieved applications to the total number
of retrieved applications,” [56] or the ratio of predicted true positive instances that were
identified correctly. All of these values are derived from information provided from the
truth table. A truth table, also known as a confusion matrix, provides the actual and pre-
dicted classifications from the predictor. The following are the mathematical definitions
of the performance formulas as well as the truth table (Table 3.1) where a (true positive) is
the number of rogue applications in the data set that were classified as rogue applications,
b (false positive) is the number of benign applications in the data set that were classified
as rogue applications, c (false negative) is the number of rogue applications in the data set
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that were classified as benign applications, and d (true negative) is the number of benign
applications in the data set that were classified as benign applications. [59]
Table 3.1
Definition of Truth Table
Actual
Positive Negative
Predicted Positive A BNegative C D
Below are the formulas for the four performance calculations that were used in this
research effort for validation of the predicted results.
T PR =
a
a+ c
(3.5)
FPR =
b
b+d
(3.6)
Accuracy =
a+d
a+b+ c+d
(3.7)
Precision =
a
a+b
(3.8)
Using these calculated performance values I can validate this work as compared to previ-
ously published work. For this I concentrated on published performance value informa-
tion from Kolter’s mutual information. Through these comparisons I was able to substan-
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tiate the claim that the methods and techniques described in this research for providing
a rogue application detection capability performed “better” than current published meth-
ods. Better is defined in terms of absolute comparison of the validation methods presented
above.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH RESULTS
Using the methods and techniques that were described in Chapter 3 above, I cre-
ated a functional rogue application detection software tool suite. This tool suite was
written in the C programming language with some administrative scripts that were written
in Perl. The preliminary experiments were performed on a server class machine running
a Linux operating system. All of the experiments using the completed tool suite were
performed on commodity Gateway PC’s running a Fedora Linux operating system. A
proof-of-concept of this tool suite was used to produce the results presented in Section 4.1
Preliminary Results. The completed robust version of the tool suite was used for the
results presented in Section 4.2.
4.1 Preliminary Results
These preliminary results were obtained from the proof-of-concept rogue applica-
tion detection software tool suite. The data used for this preliminary experiment consisted
of 267 Windows formatted binary executable files that were obtained from a Windows XP
operating system. These files ranged in size from 50KB to 500KB. Integrated within
the corpus were 24 files that had been infected with rogue code using the F.B.I. (Finding,
Binding and Infecting) binder and six standalone rogue applications for a total of 30 rogue
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applications. The Windows applications infected for this experiment were Microsoft Cal-
culator, MS-DOS Command Prompt, Microsoft Notepad and Microsoft 3D Pinball for
Windows. The rogue applications used were the CDKey Harvester v0.9, Fearless KeySpy
v2.0, LttLogger v2.0, HermanAgent v1.0, ProAgent v2.0 and Recon v2.0. Each docile
application was infected with each of the rogue applications using the F.B.I. binder to
create 24 infected files. The binder and all rogue applications are freely available for
download from the following website, http://www.trojanfrance.com. Table 4.1 contains
short descriptions of the rogue applications used in this experiment.
Table 4.1
Descriptions of Rogue Applications
CDKey Harvester v0.9 Searches victim’s registry for Online Game CD
Keys and sends them to the attacker through
email
Fearless KeySpy v2.0 keystroke logger
LttLogger v2.0 keystroke logger that can completely remove it-
self at a specified time or after a specific amount
of collection
HermanAgent v1.0 password stealer where information is passed
back to the attacker through email
ProAgent v2.0 monitoring and surveillance tool that captures
data from webcams, screenshots and micro-
phone usage
Recon v2.0 keystroke logger that can disable anti-virus and
firewall software
For this proof of concept, I limited the size of the n-grams to a 4-byte window.
This provided a boundary of the potential size of a given feature vector. Using the prede-
fined n-gram size of 4 there are approximately 4×109 number of total possible n-grams.
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The data set described above contained 6,997,927 unique n-grams. For the dimensionality
reduction stage I used a random matrix and projected it upon the original high-dimensional
data set to produce a new low-dimensional embedding that contained 500 features. The
random matrix for the projection was created by randomly selecting values to populate the
vectors of the matrix that were normally distributed random variables with a mean of 0.0
and a standard deviation of 1.0. As a comparison and validation for the randomized pro-
jection approach I implemented the feature selection mutual information approach similar
to the one described in [37]. This separate data set contains 500 features identified by the
mutual information algorithm of the original data set. I applied the cosine similarity algo-
rithm to these two data sets with the following positive results presented in Tables 4.2, 4.3
and 4.4.
Table 4.2
Performance Values Comparing Reduction Methods for Threshold of 0.55
Performance Metric Random Projection Mutual Information
TPR 0.8 0.67
FPR 0.05 0
Accuracy 0.93 0.96
Precision 0.6 1
In each case it can be seen that the randomized projection method provided a higher
TPR than the comparison Mutual Information method. This means that in each of the
above cases the mutual information method was mis-identifying a larger amount of rogue
applications as being benign than the randomized projection method. These results are
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Table 4.3
Performance Values Comparing Reduction Methods for Threshold of 0.60
Performance Metric Random Projection Mutual Information
TPR 0.8 0.73
FPR 0 0
Accuracy 0.98 0.97
Precision 1 1
Table 4.4
Performance Values Comparing Reduction Methods for Threshold of 0.65
Performance Metric Random Projection Mutual Information
TPR 0.63 0.6
FPR 0 0
Accuracy 0.96 0.95
Precision 1 1
significant suggesting that this technique can maintain a high precision without sacrificing
accuracy or TPR. The methods used in previous research, mentioned in Chapter 2, report
accuracy ratings ranging from 93% to 98%, so the results presented here were comparable
and in some cases outperformed other methods.
4.2 Experimental Results
For the full version of the experiments, I used the completed rogue application
detection tool suite. As stated above, all of these experiments were run on commodity
hardware running the Fedora Linux operating system. It is significant that I was able to
complete all of these experiments on commodity hardware. It shows that large specialized
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machines are not needed to perform rogue application detection and that this work can be
broadly applied across almost any level of architecture that researchers/developers may
have and still gain the significantly positive results that were obtained and are discussed
below. In addition, this software and the methods that it supports can easily take advantage
of commodity cluster hardware for substantial gains in performance.
4.2.1 Data Set
The data set that was compiled together for the experiments described in this sec-
tion consisted of 1544 Windows formatted binary executable files. None of the files in the
data set were larger than 950KB. Of these files 303 were extracted from a fresh installation
of the Windows XP operating system. Another 406 were extracted from a fresh installa-
tion of Windows Vista operating system. Both of these sets were obtained by installing
the respective operating system in a virtual environment that was installed on a commodity
PC. These virtual environments were not connected to the Internet and therefore provided
a safe location. This ensured that it would allow for application extraction without the
worry of rogue infiltration during the gathering phase of the research effort. This process
provided a total of 709 files that were in the data set and that were considered benign.
The remaining 835 files for the data set were rogue Trojan horse applications that were
downloaded from various websites on the Internet including http://www.trojanfrance.com
and http://vx.netlux.org.
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4.2.2 Presentation of Results
The outcome of these experiments has produced a cadre of significant results that
not only show success when compared to the research hypotheses but will also benefit the
rogue application detection community. This successful research provides an additional
pathway for attacking and effectively detecting rogue applications using static methods.
As stated in Section 2.3 above static methods offer many advantages over their dynamic
method counterparts, including but not limited to the ability to perform accurate rogue ap-
plication detection without the danger of actually executing the potential rogue application
and risking infecting more machines.
For the remainder of this chapter I will present a selected subset of the results that
were obtained using the data set described in Section 4.2.1 above and following the exper-
imental plan presented in Section 3.2. The entire set of results can be found in graphical
form in Appendix B of this document. Each graph in Appendix B represents the validation
calculations, described in Section 3.3, for each combination of n-gram value, dimension-
ality reduction value and data set instantiation (described below in Section 4.2.2.1). For
each graph I present the validation values for each cosine similarity prediction threshold
for all seven methods that were examined during the course of this research effort. As
a reminder, those methods are the control method of mutual information with the binary
feature weightings, the randomized matrix projection using the normally distributed ran-
dom variables with both the TFIDF and binary feature weightings, the randomized matrix
projection using the probability-based random variables with both the TFIDF and binary
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feature weightings and the random set projection with both the TFIDF and binary feature
weightings.
4.2.2.1 How to Read Graphs
To completely understand how to read these graphs the following example expla-
nation of results for an n-gram selection of 3, the data set instantiation of the data portion
and a feature reduction of 1000, refers to Figure 4.1 below. The upper left quadrant con-
tains the validation accuracy calculation results for the range of cosine similarity threshold
values. For this graph we are looking for the highest peak which will equate to the high-
est accuracy value for this configuration. In Figure 4.1 we can see that for the control,
which is mutual information and is the red line on the graph, the highest accuracy value
is 0.93 or 93% accuracy at a threshold value of 0.8. We can also see that each of the
random matrix projection methods outperformed this value with the randomized matrix
projection using the normally distributed random variables and binary feature weightings,
the green line, performing the best at 0.98 or 98% at a threshold value of 0.35. Using
these same two methods (mutual information and random matrix projection using nor-
mally distributed random variables and binary feature weighting) and respective threshold
values (0.8 and 0.35) we can look at the lower left quadrant, true positive rate (TPR), and
note that those methods performed identically with a TPR of 0.98 or 98%. Turning our
attention to the upper right quadrant, which is the false positive rate (FPR), we see that
the randomized projection method (green line) again outperformed the mutual informa-
tion method (red line) with values of 0.03 or 3% and 0.13 or 13% respectively. Finally,
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looking at the lower right quadrant we see that the precision values for the randomized
projection method is at 0.97 or 97% and the mutual information method is 0.89 or 89%.
Following this same process, all of the results graphs in Appendix B can be interpreted to
gain insight into the performance of all of the methods used in this research experiment.
Figure 4.1
3-gram, Data portion data set, 1000-features
We can see that for this particular n-gram, feature set size and data set instantiation
there is a significant decrease in precision when comparing the mutual information method
with the random matrix projection method. This reduction can be attributed to the large
difference in the FPR rate. In laymen’s terms, both of the example methods we are looking
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at provide the analyst with an excellent number of accurately detected rogue applications
but the randomized projection method does this with far less incorrectly identified benign
applications. This allows the analyst to complete his job much quicker and provides the
analyst with additional confidence that the methods are producing precise results.
4.2.2.2 Data Set Instantiation
To assist in obtaining a more accurate answer to the questions posed in the hy-
potheses, I created multiple instantiations of the data set. The first instantiation involved
using the entire or whole application itself. This instantiation of the data is the one that is
used by all of the researchers that are mentioned in the literature survey described in Chap-
ter 2. The remaining three were created through extracting and combining well-known
defined sections from the whole application. The second and third instantiations were cre-
ated by extracting the code and data sections from each application using the PE Explorer
tool from Heaventools. [1] To confirm the accuracy of this tool I hand dissected several
of the applications in the data set, compared my results to the results provided by PE Ex-
plorer, and found the tool to be very accurate. To create the fourth instantiation of the
data set I combined the data and code sections together. These additional instantiations
were done to determine if extracted sections of each application could prove more fruitful
in detection than by just using the entire application. The thought process behind creat-
ing these multiple instantiations was as follows. Since all of the applications in the data
set were valid Windows format executables, there would have to be an inherent similarity
in all of them. This comes from both structure and header contents which may hamper
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attempts to produce valid and viable rogue application detection. By extracting the data
and code sections I was able to remove this inherent similarity and allow the detection
methods to concentrate on the true differences in the applications. It must be noted that
with the combined data and code data set instantiation a ‘false set’ of features is created
at the point of fusion. This set is an extremely small set, at most for these experiments it
will be 7, when compared to the entire set of features that are extracted and therefore will
not hamper any detection capabilities of the tool suite.
When the results are examined from a data set instantiation viewpoint holding the
remaining variables of n-gram size and dimensionality reduction size constant, it is clear
that using the extracted data set instantiations provided a considerable increase in accuracy
when compared to using the entire or whole application. It can be further derived that the
code instantiation provides better results than the data instantiation. Even better results
can be obtained by the combination of the data and the code instantiations. An example
of this increase in accuracy can be seen in Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. These figures
are for the 4-gram experiments where the dimensionality was reduced to 1500 features.
For the whole instantiation of the data set (Figure 4.2) at a threshold of 0.9 the mutual
information method obtains an accuracy of 0.90 or 90% and at a threshold of 0.2 the
random matrix method with a normalized-based matrix and the binary feature weighting
obtains an accuracy of 0.97 or 97% accuracy. Compare this to the code instantiation of
the data set (Figure 4.4) that has an accuracy of 0.93 or 93% for the mutual information
and 0.997 or 99.7% for the random matrix projection. Similar results can be seen in both
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the data instantiation (Figure 4.3) and the combination of the data and code instantiation
(Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.2
4-gram, Whole portion data set, 1500-features
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Figure 4.3
4-gram, Data portion data set, 1500-features
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Figure 4.4
4-gram, Code portion data set, 1500-features
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Figure 4.5
4-gram, Combination portion data set, 1500-features
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This important result of the extracted instantiations outperforming the whole ap-
plication can be seen throughout the experiment. This is a positive significant step in that
this type of slicing of applications to make a rogue application detection determination has
not been published before at this level. By extracting these sections from an application,
this makes the data search space much smaller and therefore allows for a faster detection
time and a more accurate detection because of the ability to include more applications in
the detection corpus.
Again, it can be determined throughout the experiment that by looking at all of
the results, choosing the combination of the data and code instantiations performs at the
highest level. Staying with the same example as above the combination instantiation
outperformed the whole by 5% accuracy, by 1.5% TPR, by 7.4% precision and by 9.4%
FPR.
4.2.2.3 n-gram Variation
When the accuracy results are examined from an n-gram variation viewpoint, hold-
ing the remaining variables of data set instantiation and dimensionality reduction size con-
stant, it was not as clear cut as with the data set instantiation but a few significant items
surfaced. First, it could be seen that the control method of mutual information performed
best at n-gram values of 4 and 5. The n-gram value of 4 is the value that has been pub-
lished in the literature as the best expected value for mutual information. It must be noted
that there were some anomalies to this statement but for the majority of the experiments
the n-gram values of 4 and 5 performed the best for the control method of mutual informa-
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tion. As for the random projection methods, the best results in terms of highest accuracy
values were achieved at the same n-gram values of 4 and 5. Using an n-gram value of
3 produced significant results as well; however, the results using the n-gram values of 4
and 5 were better in most cases. The n-gram values of 6 and 7 produced good results for
the random projection methods, but in some cases produced poor results for the mutual
information method. As for the speed, a smaller choice for the n-gram size produced a
data search space that was much smaller and therefore allowed for a much faster calcula-
tion of the low-dimensional embeddings. Even though there was no clear cut winner on
n-gram size, there were significant results that can be noted and used in future research
experiments.
For an example of these performance differences refer to Figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8.
In this example, I have held the dimensionality reduction feature size to 1000 and the
data set instantiation to the code instantiation. Observing the accuracy values, upper left
quadrant, for each of these three graphs it can be seen that for mutual information the best
value is recorded in Figure 4.8, 5-gram, with an accuracy of 0.92 or 92% at a threshold
of 0.9 with 4-gram next at an accuracy value of 0.88 or 88%. Both of these values are
higher that the 3-gram (Figure 4.6) accuracy value of 0.87 or 87%. With respect to the
random matrix method with a normalized-based matrix and the binary feature weighting,
it obtained the best accuracy value of 0.997 or 99.7% accuracy for the n-gram value of 4
(Figure 4.7). An almost identical value of 0.996 or 99.6% was obtained when the n-gram
value was changed to 5. Both of these values were obtained at a threshold value of 0.15.
For this example even the 3-gram accuracy value is significant at 0.994 or 99.4% but still
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lower than both the 4 and 5 gram values. It must be noted that the values obtained for the
randomized matrix projection are at least 7% higher than those for mutual information,
with a maximum increase of 12%. The remaining three quadrants report similar increases
in performance. For TPR, lower left quadrant, the randomized matrix projection showed
at least a 4% increase over mutual information, with a maximum increase of 20%. At least
an 8% increase in precision, lower right quadrant, was shown with a maximum increase of
11%, and for FPR, upper right quadrant, a 9% decrease over mutual information again with
a maximum decrease of 13%. These are important results comparing these methods at
their best n-gram size determined through the experiments. Note that similar results were
obtained throughout the experiments and that these are presented here as a representation.
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Figure 4.6
3-gram, Code portion data set, 1000-features
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Figure 4.7
4-gram, Code portion data set, 1000-features
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Figure 4.8
5-gram, Code portion data set, 1000-features
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4.2.2.4 Dimensionality Reduction Variation
When the results are examined from a dimensionality reduction variation view-
point holding the remaining variables of data set instantiation and n-gram size constant,
some positive results were noticed. Of particular note another confirmation of my im-
plementation of the mutual information method was achieved. Logic would say that the
higher dimensionality reduction size of 1500 would outperform the other two sizes used in
this experiment; however, as the background literature on the mutual information method
noted, that was not the case. My experimental results, as well as those presented in the
literature, showed that a dimensionality reduction size of 500 performed the best for the
mutual information method. The one exception to that was using an n-gram size of seven.
In this case, the performance across all methods increased as the dimensionality reduction
size increased. As for the randomized projection methods, they produced very similar
results between the 1000 and 1500 size reductions and a slight decrease in performance
for the 500 size reduction. In all of the cases, even at the 500 reduction size, compar-
ing the results of the mutual information method to the randomized projection methods
showed that the randomized projection method had a better performance in all categories
of performance measurements that were used in this experiment.
An example of the change in performance with respect to dimensionality reduction
size can be seen in Figures 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11. For these examples the data set instantiation
is set to the combination of the data and code instantiations and the n-gram size is held
constant at a size of 5. The mutual information method has a decrease of 3% from 0.98
or 98% at a feature reduction size of 500 to 0.95 or 95% at a size of 1500. The random
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matrix method with a normalized-based matrix and the binary feature weighting has an
increase of 1% to 0.99 or 99% when moving from a feature reduction size of 500 to 1500.
Similar performance degradations can be seen in the remaining performance measures
for the mutual information method: decrease in TPR by 2%, increase in FPR by 4% and
decrease in precision by 3%. As for the random matrix projection, similar performance
gains can be seen in both FPR, 2% decrease, and precision, 2% increase. The TPR value
stayed constant through the dimensionality reduction changes. Again, as in all of the
above variations, the randomized projection methods outperformed the mutual information
method. This again shows the significance of this method when compared to the standard
accepted method of mutual information.
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Figure 4.9
5-gram, Combination portion data set, 500-features
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Figure 4.10
5-gram, Combination portion data set, 1000-features
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Figure 4.11
5-gram, Combination portion data set, 1500-features
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4.2.2.5 Hypotheses Answered
The results provided with this research effort show that it is possible to create a vi-
able rogue application detection capability using the concepts of randomized projections.
As can be seen in the last several subsections, applying my randomized projection meth-
ods as a dimensionality reduction technique has provided several significant and positive
results. This can be noted with any of the three dissections that were presented. In this
section, I will provide additional examples that were obtained from this effort to show
as proof that the hypotheses defined for this research have been answered in the affirma-
tive. Before presenting these results I will restate each of the hypotheses for the reader’s
convenience.
Hypothesis 1:
By applying and extending the information retrieval technique of n-gram
analysis and the data mining technique of attribute extraction, a Trojan horse,
rogue application detection capability tool can be developed that will provide
a true positive rate above 98% and false positive rate below 3%.
To answer Hypothesis 1 I was able to show conclusively that a true positive rate
greater then 98% and a false positive rate less than 3% can be obtained. One of the many
examples of this can be seen in Figure 4.12. In this particular example I have restricted
the data set instantiation to the code instantiation, the n-gram size is restricted to 6 and the
dimensionality reduction size is restricted to 1000 features. For each of the randomized
matrix projection methods in this example I obtained greater than a 98% true positive rate
performance value and a less than 3% false positive rate. In fact, for the entire set of
research experiments which consisted of 60 separate experiments for each of the seven
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dimensionality reduction methods, the random matrix method with a normalized-based
matrix and the binary feature weighting reached this goal 52 times. The random matrix
method with a probability-based matrix and the binary feature weighting also produced a
result of 52 times reaching or surpassing the goal. The random matrix projection using
the TFIDF feature weighting did not fair as well but still had an overall average of 0.97 or
97% for both the probability-based and the normalized-based random matrices. Note that
all of the random matrix TPR performance averages were between 2% - 4% higher than
the mutual information results. Again, this is significant showing the viability of these
methods.
Figure 4.12
6-gram, Code portion data set, 1000-features
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With regards to the FPR rate and the entire set of research experiments, these were
not as impressive but still very positive. The random matrix method with a normalized-
based matrix and the binary feature weighting reached this goal 33 times. More impor-
tantly for the code instantiation of the data set this method reached the goal of 3% or less
FPR on all 15 experiments. The random matrix method with a probability-based matrix
and the binary feature weighting also produced a result of 31 times reaching or surpass-
ing the goal. Here again for the code instantiation of the data set the method performed
extremely well reaching or surpassing the goal 14 of the 15 experiments. As for the TPR
results the TFIDF weighting experiments did not perform as well as the binary weighting
experiments; however, in a good number of cases, they outperformed the mutual informa-
tion experiments, in some cases by as much as 8%.
These research results are significant proving that a rogue application detection
capability tool can be developed within strict performance bounds using information re-
trieval and data mining techniques. These TPR and FPR results show that the feature ex-
traction method of randomized projection using cosine similarity as a prediction method
also outperforms the accepted feature selection method of mutual information at almost
every instance of the experiment and at some instances by a great margin. For example
using the whole portion of the data set, an n-gram size of 4 and a dimensionality reduction
size of 1000 features, the random matrix method with a normalized-based matrix and the
binary feature weighting had a 45% higher TPR value than the mutual information method
using the binary feature weighting. In another example, this time using the code instan-
tiation of the data set, an n-gram size of 6 and a dimensionality size of 1500 features, the
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random matrix method with a normalized-based matrix and the binary feature weighting
had a 22% lower FPR value than the mutual information method using the binary feature
weighting. Again these are just a few examples of the entire experimental set but they
show the viability and value of using the random projection method in developing a rogue
application detection tool suite.
Hypothesis 2:
By combining information retrieval and data mining techniques in concert
with the dimensionality reduction technique of randomized projection, a more
accurate solution in detecting rogue attacks can be developed when com-
pared to seminal efforts currently used in research today. A more accurate
solution is defined in terms of a 3% increase in overall accuracy when com-
paring this method to that of the mutual information dimensionality reduction
method.
To answer Hypothesis 2, I was able to show conclusively that when compared to
the control method of mutual information an overall accuracy gain of 3% can be obtained.
One of the many examples of this can be seen in Figure 4.13. In this particular example I
have restricted the data set instantiation to the data section of the applications, the n-gram
size is restricted to 7 and the dimensionality reduction size is restricted to 1500 features.
For each of the randomized matrix projection methods in this example I obtained an in-
crease of greater than 3% in the overall accuracy performance value when compared to
the control method of mutual information. In fact, for the entire set of research exper-
iments which consisted of 60 separate experiments for each of the seven dimensionality
reduction methods, the random matrix method with a normalized-based matrix and the
binary feature weighting reached this goal 42 times. The random matrix method with a
probability-based matrix and the binary feature weighting produced a result of 39 times
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reaching or surpassing the goal. The random matrix projection using the TFIDF feature
weighting did not fair as well, but still had an overall average that produced an accuracy
rate that was greater than the mutual information method for both the probability-based
and the normalized-based random matrices. On average, the randomized matrix projec-
tion method when using the binary feature weighting produced an overall difference of
over a 5% higher accuracy value compared with that of the mutual information method.
This is again significant, showing the viability of these methods.
Figure 4.13
7-gram, Data portion data set, 1500-features
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As with the TPR and FPR results described above for Hypothesis 1, these research
results are significant proving that by using randomized projection as a feature extraction
method a rogue application detection capability tool can be developed that out-performs
feature selection methods. These accuracy results again show that the feature extraction
method of randomized projection outperforms the accepted feature selection method of
mutual information in an overwhelming majority of instances of the experiments and at
some instances by a great margin. For example using the whole portion of the data set, an
n-gram size of 4 and a dimensionality reduction size of 1000 features, the random matrix
method with a normalized-based matrix and the binary feature weighting had an overall
accuracy performance value difference of over 28% higher than the mutual information
method using the binary feature weighting. In another example, this time using the data
instantiation of the data set, an n-gram size of 7 and a dimensionality size of 1000 features,
the random matrix method with a normalized-based matrix and the binary feature weight-
ing had an overall difference of almost 13% higher than the mutual information method
using the binary feature weighting. As with the TPR and FPR values, these are just a few
examples of the entire experimental set, but they show the viability and value of using the
random projection method in developing a rogue application detection tool suite.
4.3 Summary
Although I have presented results that clearly show that the hypothesized method
for rogue application detection is viable, not every method performed as well as expected.
As can be seen in most every graph in Appendix B, the random set method did not perform
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well. I have had good results in the past with this method [7] but for this particular set of
experiments this method greatly underperformed. It is my belief that this method may not
be suitable to such a high dimension and therefore should only be used when the original
feature space is not as large as the one that is presented in these experiments. Another
potential reason that the random set feature extraction method did not perform as well as
expected could have been because of the prediction method that was used. With another
prediction method such as nearest neighbor, this method might have performed just as well
as its random matrix projection counterpart. Further experimentation with this method
will be something I will continue to look at in the future to determine a better bounds on
its applicability.
Another aspect that did not perform as expected was the TFIDF vector space fea-
ture weighting method. In almost every experiment the TFIDF method was out-performed
by its binary feature weighting counterpart. In contrast to the random set projection
discussed above, the prediction algorithm of cosine similarity is traditionally used when
TFIDF feature weighting is applied. Therefore, additional prediction algorithms tested,
at least on the surface, do not seem to be appropriate. However, I plan to do further
experimentations in the future. For now, the conclusion from this research effort is that
with this type of non-traditional data TFIDF is not applicable, even though in traditional
information retrieval this method has had great success.
These two items aside, the results of this research effort have provided the rogue
application detection community with a powerful tool for their toolbox. As stated in the
motivation section of this dissertation, it is my belief that a multi-pronged defense ap-
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proach where there are several weapons in the administrator’s toolbox is needed to attack
this problem. By developing a more effective rogue application detection tool through
the use of information retrieval and data mining methodologies, as well as dimensionality
reduction through randomized projections, I have provided one more weapon in the con-
sumer’s toolbox to attack this problem. No one is immune from these malicious attacks;
from the corporation to the unsuspecting home user, everyone is at risk. Therefore, an en-
tire range of consumers can benefit from the promising results of this important research
effort.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PLANS
5.1 Conclusion
The results presented above provided through actual experimentation both support
and validate each of the hypotheses stated in Chapter 1 that applying the dimensionality
reduction technique of randomized projection before using the cosine similarity algorithm
has merit in determining if an application may contain rogue functionality. There is no
claim that this is a complete solution, rather a tool designed to fit into the security admin-
istrator’s toolbox as a data point or first pass to help reduce the number of applications
needing review. This potential reduction in number of applications to sort through can
provide an administrator or analyst with valuable time saving by not having to analyze
applications that clearly do not contain rogue functionality. With more and more appli-
cations not being developed “in-house” this is a positive result for those responsible for
providing secure solutions.
5.2 Future Work
This section includes ideas of future topics to concentrate on and directions to take
the rogue application detection tool suite on now that this portion of the research effort has
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been completed. Future work with this research will follow two major pathways: first,
continual improvement of the tool suite to include additional manipulations of the data set
and expansion of prediction methods, and second not to be limited to the general task at
hand of developing a rogue application detection capability but also using the underling
methods and techniques by applying them to a diverse set of fields.
5.2.1 Continual Improvement
In the future I am interested in integrating additional prediction algorithms into
the tool suite, such as a decision tree, neural network and k nearest neighbor algorithms.
Furthermore, with this research using multiple prediction methods there is also an experi-
mental track that involves how to cleverly combine the results of the methods to produce
one result that has the potential of being more accurate than any of the individual mod-
els by themselves. This will involve applying a voting method where each model will
get a vote and the majority vote becomes the prediction. Another method introduced by
Todorovski et al. [67] is called Meta Decision Tree (MDT). The leaf nodes of an MDT
provide the prediction model to use and the internal decisions are made “based on the class
probability distributions for the given [query].” [67] This may provide the mechanism to
extend the method of random set projection. Another potential improvement to the tool
suite will be to add the capability to start the sliding window outside of the traditional byte
boundaries. This type of ‘bit-shifting’ may allow for a higher granularity in the tool suites
detection capability.
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5.2.2 Diverse Applications
There are several potential applications and further enhancements of this research
that I am interested in exploring. Some of these include computer forensics, code cloning
and application authorship detection. This tool suite could easily be used by a computer
forensics examiner to look at an entire hard drive that contains applications of unknown
capabilities or an individual application. Code cloning is another interesting application of
this research that is outside of the realm of computer security. Code cloning is a software
engineering application that involves determining if a given application exists in multiple
locations. Knowing this information is very helpful for software development firms as
they try to update their software repositories. This tool again could easily be used to troll
through a corpus of applications to determine if there exist similar applications to the one
in question. These are just a few of the pathways that this method could be used for in the
future.
5.3 Publication Plan
The following publications related to this research have been published:
• Travis Atkison, “Applying Randomized Projection to aid Prediction Algorithms in
Detecting High-Dimensional Rogue Applications,” Proceedings of the 47th ACM
Southeast Conference, Clemson, SC, March 2009.
• Travis Atkison, “Using an Information Retrieval Technique to Discover Malicious
Software,” Proceedings of the 5th Symposium on Risk Management and Cyber-
Informatics, Orlando, Florida, June 2008, International Institute of Informatics
and Systemics, pp. 284 - 289.
The following publications related to this research are currently in review:
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• Travis Atkison, “Randomized Projection versus Mutual Information: A Compari-
son Study on Rogue Application Detection,” International Journal of Information
Technology & Decision Making.
• Travis Atkison, “Using a Static Analysis Method in Detecting High-Dimensional
Rogue Applications,” the 16th International Static Analysis Symposium to be held
in Los Angeles, CA, August 2009.
The following publications related to this research are planned:
• “Using Application Section Extraction and Randomized Projection to Improve
Rogue Application Detection”
• “Randomized Projection Versus Principle Component Analysis: A Comparison
Study on Rogue Application Detection”
• “Comparing Randomized Projection and Mutual Information Using Application
Section Extraction to Improve Rogue Application Detection”
• “Comparing Randomized Matrix Creation Methods in a Rogue Application De-
tection Environment”
5.4 Candidate Journals
The following list of journals represents candidate outlets for future publication of
this research.
1. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security - This journal is interested
in security technologies including virus and Trojan horse detection which is the
main thrust of this effort.
2. Computers and Security - This is one of the leading sources for applied research
in computer security which is a direct fit with this research.
3. ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Min-
ing - This research effort is an excellent example of direct application of data min-
ing techniques and methodologies.
4. Journal of Machine Learning - The scope of this journal includes accounts of ap-
plications as well as experimental studies into the use of machine learning and data
mining.
5. Journal of Information Assurance and Security - This research effort fits nicely
within this journal regarding topics of detection of viruses and Trojan horses.
6. Journal of Information Assurance, Security and Protection - This journal’s main
focus is on information-based security. Our efforts fall directly in that realm.
83
7. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - A direct application of
this work lies in the forensics world which would be a good fit for this journal.
8. International Journal on Information Security - This journal has interest in direct
applications of information security methods including virus and Trojan horse de-
tection.
9. Information Retrieval - This journal is interested in application of information re-
trieval techniques to real-world problems such as our effort in rogue application
detection.
10. Journal of Computer Security - This journal has interest in research related to
protection against unauthorized disclosure or modification of information which
fits nicely into the areas of this research effort.
11. IEEE Security and Privacy - This journal has a broad interest in computer security,
including methods for detecting and securing infrastructure and the enterprise.
5.5 Candidate Conferences
The following list of conferences represents candidate outlets for future publica-
tion of this research.
1. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy - This conference interests include
rogue application detection involving detection of viruses and Trojan horses.
2. USENIX Security Symposium - This conference has interest in many topics of
security including the areas contained within this research effort.
3. SIAM International Conference on Data Mining - This conference has interest in
applications of data mining techniques and methods.
4. ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security - This
effort has direct application to this conference in the area of rogue application
detection.
5. Computer Security Applications Conference - As the name suggests, this confer-
ence has interest in direct application of computer security techniques and meth-
ods.
6. ACM SIGIR Information Retrieval Conference - This conference has interest in
application of information retrieval techniques to real-world problems such as our
effort in rogue application detection.
7. Computer Security Conference - This conference has interest in managing security
risk which this research has direct applications to.
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APPENDIX A
ADLEMAN’S THEOREM FOR DETECTING VIRUSES
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For all Gödel numberings of the partial recursive functions {φi}
V = {i|φi is a virus} is Π2− complete
Proof
Let T = {i|φi is a total}. It is well known (§13 and §14 in [52]) that T is Π2− complete.
To establish that T ≤1 V , let j ∈V (for example let j be an index for the identity function)
and consider the function g : N → N such that for i,y ∈ N:
g(i,y) =
{
φ j(y) i f φi(y) ↓
↑ otherwise
Then g is a partial recursive function. Let k be an index for g, and let f : N → N, be such
that:
(∀i ∈ N)[ f (i) = s(k,1, i)]
where s is as in the s−m−n theorem [52].
Then f is a total recursive function and:
(∀i,y ∈ N)
[
φ f (i)(y) = φs(k,1,i)(y) = φk(i,y) = g(i,y) =
{
φ j(y) i f φi(y) ↓
↑ otherwise
]
It follows that:
i ∈ T ⇔ f (i) ∈V
Thus T ≤m V . It follows, as in §7.2 in [52], that T ≤1 V as desired.
To establish that V ∈Π2, consider the following formula for V which arises directly from
the definition of virus:
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(∀ j)(∃k, t) [H(i, j,k, t)]
&
(∀< d, p >) [(∀ j1,k1, t1)
[H(i, j1,k1, t1)⇒
(∀< e,q >, t2)[¬H(k1,< d, p >,< e, p >, t2)]]
or
(∀ j1,k1, t1, j2,k2, t2)
[[H(i, j1,k1, t1) & H(i, j2,k2, t2)]⇒
(∃< e,q >, t3, t4)
[H(k1,< d, p >,< e,q >, t3) &
H(k2,< d, p >,< e,q >, t4)]]
or
(∀ j1,k1, t1,< e,q >, t2)
[[H(i, j1,k1, t1) & H( j1,< d, p >,< e,q >, t2)]⇒
(∃< e′,q′ >, t3, t4)
[H(k1,< d, p >,< e′,q′ >, t3) &
L(i,< e,q >,< e′,q′ >, t4)]
&
H(i, j1,k1, t1) & H(k1,< d, p >,< e,q >, t2)]⇒
(∃< e′,q′ >, t3, t4)
[H( j,< d, p >,< e′,q′ >, t3) &
L(i,< e′,q′ >,< e,q >, t4)]]]
Where H is a ‘step counting’ predicate for {φi} such that:
(∀i, j,k)
i f φi( j) = k then (∃t)[H(i, j,k, t)]
i f φi( j) 6= k then (∀t)[¬H(i, j,k, t)]
And where L is a predicate for {φi} such that:
(∀i,< e,q >,< e′,q′ >, t)
i f < e,q >∼φi< e′,q′ > then (∃t)[L(i,< e,q >,< e′,q′ >, t)]
i f < e,q >φi< e′,q′ > then (∀t)[¬L(i,< e,q >,< e′,q′ >, t)]
Since for all acceptable Gödel numberings of the partial recursive functions {φi} it is eas-
ily seen that there exist recursive predicates H and L as above, it follows that V ∈Π2.
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APPENDIX B
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS GRAPHS
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Figure B.1
3-gram, Whole portion data set, 500-features
Figure B.2
3-gram, Data portion data set, 500-features
95
Figure B.3
3-gram, Code portion data set, 500-features
Figure B.4
3-gram, Combination portion data set, 500-features
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Figure B.5
3-gram, Whole portion data set, 1000-features
Figure B.6
3-gram, Data portion data set, 1000-features
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Figure B.7
3-gram, Code portion data set, 1000-features
Figure B.8
3-gram, Combination portion data set, 1000-features
98
Figure B.9
3-gram, Whole portion data set, 1500-features
Figure B.10
3-gram, Data portion data set, 1500-features
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Figure B.11
3-gram, Code portion data set, 1500-features
Figure B.12
3-gram, Combination portion data set, 1500-features
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Figure B.13
4-gram, Whole portion data set, 500-features
Figure B.14
4-gram, Data portion data set, 500-features
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Figure B.15
4-gram, Code portion data set, 500-features
Figure B.16
4-gram, Combination portion data set, 500-features
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Figure B.17
4-gram, Whole portion data set, 1000-features
Figure B.18
4-gram, Data portion data set, 1000-features
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Figure B.19
4-gram, Code portion data set, 1000-features
Figure B.20
4-gram, Combination portion data set, 1000-features
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Figure B.21
4-gram, Whole portion data set, 1500-features
Figure B.22
4-gram, Data portion data set, 1500-features
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Figure B.23
4-gram, Code portion data set, 1500-features
Figure B.24
4-gram, Combination portion data set, 1500-features
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Figure B.25
5-gram, Whole portion data set, 500-features
Figure B.26
5-gram, Data portion data set, 500-features
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Figure B.27
5-gram, Code portion data set, 500-features
Figure B.28
5-gram, Combination portion data set, 500-features
108
Figure B.29
5-gram, Whole portion data set, 1000-features
Figure B.30
5-gram, Data portion data set, 1000-features
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Figure B.31
5-gram, Code portion data set, 1000-features
Figure B.32
5-gram, Combination portion data set, 1000-features
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Figure B.33
5-gram, Whole portion data set, 1500-features
Figure B.34
5-gram, Data portion data set, 1500-features
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Figure B.35
5-gram, Code portion data set, 1500-features
Figure B.36
5-gram, Combination portion data set, 1500-features
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Figure B.37
6-gram, Whole portion data set, 500-features
Figure B.38
6-gram, Data portion data set, 500-features
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Figure B.39
6-gram, Code portion data set, 500-features
Figure B.40
6-gram, Combination portion data set, 500-features
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Figure B.41
6-gram, Whole portion data set, 1000-features
Figure B.42
6-gram, Data portion data set, 1000-features
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Figure B.43
6-gram, Code portion data set, 1000-features
Figure B.44
6-gram, Combination portion data set, 1000-features
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Figure B.45
6-gram, Whole portion data set, 1500-features
Figure B.46
6-gram, Data portion data set, 1500-features
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Figure B.47
6-gram, Code portion data set, 1500-features
Figure B.48
6-gram, Combination portion data set, 1500-features
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Figure B.49
7-gram, Whole portion data set, 500-features
Figure B.50
7-gram, Data portion data set, 500-features
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Figure B.51
7-gram, Code portion data set, 500-features
Figure B.52
7-gram, Combination portion data set, 500-features
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Figure B.53
7-gram, Whole portion data set, 1000-features
Figure B.54
7-gram, Data portion data set, 1000-features
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Figure B.55
7-gram, Code portion data set, 1000-features
Figure B.56
7-gram, Combination portion data set, 1000-features
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Figure B.57
7-gram, Whole portion data set, 1500-features
Figure B.58
7-gram, Data portion data set, 1500-features
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Figure B.59
7-gram, Code portion data set, 1500-features
Figure B.60
7-gram, Combination portion data set, 1500-features
124
